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Reading Between the (Surplus) Lines: Genzer v. James
River Insurance Co. and the Tenth Circuit Loosening the
Hold of Ridesharing Insurance Policy
I. Introduction
The rise of Uber and other popular ridesharing1 services has
revolutionized the way society travels, but at a great cost. A recent study
from the University of Chicago’s Becker-Friedman Institute showed that
ridesharing has increased traffic deaths and accidents by 987 deaths
annually, an increase of three percent per year.2 This sobering statistic puts
a number on the risk related to the runaway success of Uber, Lyft, and other
ridesharing services—and gives credence to the complaints regarding the
radical way Uber, in particular, approaches risk management.
Uber began operations in 2010 as a way for passengers to ride directly
with commercial drivers, and in 2012, it began its far more well-known
“peer-to-peer” ridesharing service (known as UberX). 3 As of October 2020,
Uber’s market share has since grown to seventy-one percent, well ahead of
its main competitor Lyft (at twenty-seven percent).4 The essential
ingredient to the ascent of Uber and other ridesharing companies—drivers
using their own cars to transport passengers—also forms the backbone of
its controversy in many areas, including liability.
Uber insists it is not a “common carrier[]” (as for-hire transportation
companies like taxicab companies are); rather, it posits itself as an
“interactive computer service,” acting as an intermediary between drivers

1. The term “ridesharing” will be used in this Note as Genzer v. James River Insurance
Co. uses that term to describe this type of service. 934 F.3d 1156, 1158 (10th Cir. 2019)
(describing Genzer as a “rideshare driver for Uber”). Other terms used in this Note’s sources
include “transportation network companies/TNCs” (used in state and federal statutes and
some cases) and “ride-hailing services” (used in accordance with the Associated Press
stylebook). See generally Benjamin Freed, Why You Shouldn’t Call Uber and Lyft “RideSharing,” WASHINGTONIAN (June 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonian.com/2015/06/30/
why-you-shouldnt-call-uber-and-lyft-ride-sharing/.
2. John M. Barrios, Yael V. Hochberg & Hanyi Yi, The Cost of Convenience:
Ridesharing and Traffic Fatalities 25 (Becker Friedman Inst. UChicago Working Paper No.
2019-49, 2019), https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/BFI_WP_201949.pdf.
3. Mark Macmurdo, Comment, Hold the Phone! “Peer-to-Peer” Ridesharing Services,
Regulation, and Liability, 76 LA. L. REV. 307, 309 (2015).
4. E. Mazareanu, Leading Ride-Hailing Companies in U.S. by Market Share 20172020, STATISTA (Nov. 30, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/910704/market-shareof-rideshare-companies-united-states/.
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and riders.5 Uber’s Terms and Conditions plainly state it does “not provide
transportation services . . . and has no responsibility or liability for any
transportation services provided to [the user] by such third parties.”6
In theory, this open-ended condition should impose liability on the
individual driver’s insurer. Indeed, Uber’s original insurance structure used
this as a guidepost, providing insurance on a contingency basis in the event
a driver’s insurance policy would not cover them. 7 However, exclusions in
most conventional insurers’ policies that would otherwise impose liability
generally do not apply to ridesharing. 8 For example, a policy might apply to
“carpools,” where drivers pick up riders, but might not extend this to
“livery” coverage, where the driver or car owner profits from the ride—
with the latter usually requiring a more expensive policy. 9
Insurance regulators on the national and state levels have warned both
Uber drivers and riders of potential coverage gaps.10 Because of these risks,
Uber sources insurance coverage for its drivers and riders through thirdparty insurers, including those in the surplus lines market. 11 A surplus lines
insurer, also known as a “specialty insurer,” operates outside of a state’s
regulatory scheme and covers risks that other insurers will not. 12 Uber’s

5. R.J. LEHMANN, R ST. INST., POL’Y STUDY NO. 28, BLURRED LINES: INSURANCE
CHALLENGES IN THE RIDE-SHARING MARKET 3 (2014), https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/04/RSTREET28-1.pdf.
6. Id.
7. See Ron Lieber, The Question of Coverage for Ride Service Drivers, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 5, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/06/your-money/auto-insurance/offload
ing-the-risk-in-renting-a-car-ride.html.
8. LEHMANN, supra note 5, at 6.
9. Id.
10. See generally Commercial Ride-Sharing, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS: CTR. FOR INS.
POL’Y & RSCH., https://content.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_commercial_ride_sharing.htm
(last updated Mar. 4, 2020); see also States Warn of Rideshare Risks for Passengers, NBC
NEWS (June 5, 2014, 2:29 PM CDT), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/stateswarn-rideshare-risks-passengers-n116736 (“California, Connecticut, the District of
Columbia, Idaho, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee and Utah have all issued warnings about possible
insurance risks from using rideshare services.”).
11. Judy Greenwald, Where a Driver’s Personal Coverage Leaves Off and Uber’s Picks
Up, BUS. INS. (Apr. 10, 2016), https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20160410/
NEWS06/304109977/Business-Insurance-2016-Risk-Manager-of-the-Year-Gus-Fuldneruses-individual-ins.
12. Surplus Lines, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS: CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y & RSCH.,
https://content.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_surplus_lines.htm (last updated Sept. 22, 2020).
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head of insurance has stated the company takes significant advantage of
surplus lines insurance on account of this flexibility. 13
Most of the insurance companies Uber works with, such as Progressive
Corp., are household names that issue all types of insurance. 14 Conversely,
James River Insurance Company, the defendant in the titular case,
exclusively deals in surplus lines insurance, covering businesses with risks
other underwriters would “simply decline.”15 Until James River’s decision
in late 2019 to cancel all of its insurance policies issued to Rasier, LLC (a
wholly owned subsidiary of Uber that acts as an intermediary for its
contracts and insurance policies), Uber was its largest client.16 As deciding
factors in winding down its Uber accounts nationwide, James River cited
Florida’s large proportion of uninsured motorists, and California’s recently
enacted statute designating Uber’s independent contractors as employees.17
Even before James River cancelled its Uber policies, some insurance
regulators expressed doubt over the company’s insurance model in the
ridesharing context.18 They were concerned James River’s one-size-fits-all
Uber policies contravened state regulations and provided inadequate
coverage to drivers—particularly during the period between rides when a
driver stays logged in to the “UberPartner” or “Uber Driver” app awaiting
her next ride. 19
In response to these claims, one Uber representative said the company
routinely provides $1 million in liability coverage during a pickup or ride. 20
Uber only feels the need to use “limited backup coverage” during the period
in between rides, known as “Period 1” in the industry. 21 In Uber’s view,
“Period 1” is “the same as waiting at home for temp work.”22 On the
13. Greenwald, supra note 11.
14. Matthew Lerner, James River Trades Down on Uber Affiliate’s Policy
Cancellations, BUS. INS. (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/
20191009/NEWS06/912331083/James-River-trades-down-on-Rasier-policy-cancellations.
15. Welcome, JAMES RIVER INS. CO., https://www.jamesriverins.com/ (last visited Jan.
14, 2021).
16. Lerner, supra note 14.
17. Suzanne Barlyn, Why James River Insurance Dumped Uber Account, INS. J. (Nov.
8, 2019), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2019/11/08/547942.htm.
18. See Charles Elmore, Uber’s Florida Fight: Whose Insurance Pays and When, PALM
BEACH POST (Sept. 24, 2015, 4:54 PM), https://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/ubersflorida-fight-whose-insurance-pays-and-when/nkWSg/.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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litigation front, coverage during “Period 1” with James River’s policies has
become a major issue.23 In Genzer v. James River Insurance Co., the Tenth
Circuit upheld a coverage denial for an Uber driver who suffered an
accident during “Period 1.”24
This Note will argue that the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Genzer, the first
federal appellate court case in this emerging area of insurance litigation,
continues an unfortunate trend. In recent years, courts have looked at
insurance policy terms in the insured’s favor. In the specific context of
ridesharing, though, courts seem more willing to strictly construe these
terms without factoring in the ways they help ridesharing companies’
insurers avoid liability. By giving insurers the benefit of the doubt, even
when a policy’s terms contravene state law, courts are unknowingly leaving
a significant regulatory loophole open.
Part II of this Note will detail the history of ridesharing regulation in
Oklahoma and other jurisdictions, as well as key Oklahoma insurance laws
applicable to Genzer’s facts. Part III will detail the facts of the case and the
procedural history. Part IV will examine the Tenth Circuit’s holding in
Genzer in detail. Finally, Part V will analyze the holding as applied to both
ridesharing insurance law specifically and Oklahoma insurance law
generally.
II. Law Before the Case
A. How Other Jurisdictions Have Generally Treated Uber & James River
Initially, Uber and its competitors operated outside of the complex and
vast regulatory frameworks governing urban and for-hire transportation, at
both the municipal and state levels. 25 Unlike the companies caught in those
regulatory webs, such as cab companies and public transit services,
ridesharing companies have repeatedly asserted they are not “common
carriers.”26
As Uber, Lyft, and other ridesharing services gained in popularity, states
took notice; many state and municipal governments began creating separate
regulatory schemes specifically for these services instead of placing
ridesharing into existing schemes for urban and for-hire transportation.27 In
recent years, Uber and Lyft have even been “kicked out” of several
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See infra Section II.A.
934 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2019).
Macmurdo, supra note 3, at 313–14.
See LEHMANN, supra note 5.
Macmurdo, supra note 3, at 315.
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municipalities for not complying with tougher regulations on background
checks and insurance, among other areas of regulation. 28
California, the birthplace of both Uber and Lyft, was one of the first
states to impose a statewide regulatory scheme for ridesharing. 29 In 2013,
the California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) imposed sanctions on
Uber and Lyft for having “illegally operated as ‘charter-party carriers’
without licenses,” in violation of a multitude of regulations governing “forhire transportation” and common carriers in California.30 In September of
that year, the CPUC created a new carrier category specifically for
ridesharing services: “[t]ransportation [n]etwork [c]ompanies.” 31
Many other states have since followed suit. A 2017 study by the Texas
A&M Transportation Institute found that forty-eight states and the District
of Columbia had some form of statewide or districtwide regulatory scheme
imposed on ridesharing. 32 In June 2018, Vermont imposed a regulatory
scheme of its own.33 As of publication date for this Note, Oregon was the
only state without statewide regulation on ridesharing, in part due to a
scandal in Portland involving Uber skirting the city’s insurance
ordinances. 34
Legislators introduced these new schemes shortly after tragedy struck in
Uber’s hometown of San Francisco. In a highly publicized incident on
December 31, 2013, an Uber driver struck and killed a five-year-old girl
during “Period 1.”35 Uber, as well as Evanston Insurance Company, a
28. See Dave Lee, What Happened in the City That Banned Uber, BBC NEWS (Sept. 30,
2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-41450980 (discussing Uber and Lyft’s 2016
ban in Austin, Texas, and its reintroduction one year later after statewide rules preempted the
tougher municipal regulations); see also Gwyn Topham, Uber Granted Two-Month
Extension to London Licence, GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2019, 5:23 AM EDT), https://
www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/sep/24/uber-london-licence-transport-for-london
(discussing Transport for London’s decision not to license Uber due to concerns about
passenger safety).
29. See Macmurdo, supra note 3, at 315.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. MAARIT MORAN, BEN ETTELMAN, GRETCHEN STOELTJE, TODD HANSEN & ASHESH
PANT, TEX. A&M TRANSP. INST., NO. PRC 17-70 F, POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF
TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANIES: FINAL REPORT 3 (2017), https://static.tti.tamu.
edu/tti.tamu.edu/documents/PRC-17-70-F.pdf.
33. Owain James, Uber and Lyft Are Lobbying States to Prohibit Local Regulation,
MOBILITY LAB (July 24, 2018), https://mobilitylab.org/2018/07/24/uber-and-lyft-arelobbying-states-to-prohibit-local-regulation/.
34. See id.
35. Macmurdo, supra note 3, at 308.
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surplus lines carrier that works with Uber and issued the policy, 36 denied
liability for Uber’s driver.37 The companies claimed the driver had no
passengers “in between calls,” and that Uber’s $1 million liability policy
did not cover the girl’s wrongful death.38
The resulting case, Liu v. Uber Technologies, Inc., ultimately settled in
2015.39 Uber filed counterclaims against Evanston for bad faith later that
year.40 Nonetheless, the public outcry ensuing from Liu’s worst-case
scenario compelled California’s legislature to enact new statutes requiring
minimum coverage during “Period 1.”41
Despite state legislatures’ efforts to mandate “Period 1” coverage, courts
have generally upheld surplus lines carriers’ policy provisions denying
liability. For example, in Jean v. James River Insurance Co., the Louisiana
Court of Appeals held that James River’s practice of waiving uninsured
motorist (“UM”) coverage during “Period 1” fit within the bounds of the
state’s rideshare services statute.42 The District of Nevada, in Martin v.
James River Insurance Co., granted James River’s motion to dismiss under
similar circumstances, saying the driver’s coverage was permissibly
waived. 43 In Maxwell v. James River Insurance Co.,44 the District of
Colorado upheld another coverage denial and waiver from James River. 45
The court added that Uber could be considered a “livery service” under her

36. Evanston Ins. Co. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C 15-03988 WHA, 2015 WL 8597239,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2015).
37. Id.
38. See id. at *3 (“Evanston argues that the written terms of its policy preclude coverage
[for the car accident] as a matter of law.”); Answer & Affirmative Defenses of Defendants
Uber Technologies, Inc., Rasier LLC, & Rasier-CA LLC to Plaintiffs‘ Complaint at 2, 6–7,
Liu v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CGC-14-536979 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 1, 2014).
39. Order Granting Petition to Approve Compromise of a Minor’s Claim, Liu v. Uber
Techs., Inc., No. CGC-14-536979 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 23, 2015).
40. Evanston, 2015 WL 8597239, at *1.
41. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5433(c) (2015) (providing that minimum coverage is
required “from the moment a participating driver logs on to the transportation network
company’s online-enabled application or platform until the driver accepts a request to
transport a passenger, and from the moment the driver completes the transaction . . . or the
ride is complete . . . until the driver either accepts another ride request . . . or logs off”).
42. 274 So.3d 43, 46 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2019) (citing LA. STAT. ANN. § 201.6
(2020)).
43. 366 F. Supp. 3d 1186, 1189–90 (D. Nev. 2019).
44. 401 F. Supp. 3d 1183 (D. Colo. 2019).
45. Id. at 1189, 1192.
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separate auto policy with Twin City Fire, which did not have specific
ridesharing coverage either.46
As these cases illustrate, regulators in nearly every state have imposed a
scheme on ridesharing, but courts still seem to view insurance provisions
with some degree of stringency. Oklahoma is no exception.
B. Oklahoma’s Ridesharing Statute & Insurance Law
1. The OTNC Services Act
Keeping in line with the national trend towards regulating ridesharing,
Oklahoma enacted the Oklahoma Transportation Network Company
(“OTNC”) Services Act in 2015.47 Like several other states, Oklahoma
regulates Uber and other ridesharing services as a separate and distinct
category of carrier.48 The OTNC Services Act’s language openly states
ridesharing services are not “considered motor carriers of persons . . .
nor . . . considered to provide taxicab, limousine, or similar for-hire motor
carrier service.”49 Despite the state regulating ridesharing companies as a
distinct class of carrier and excluding them from being called “motor
carriers,”50 another Oklahoma statute, the Motor Carrier Act of 1995,
excludes municipal taxi companies from the “common carrier” definition. 51
This has not, however, impacted taxi drivers from similar regulations
imposed by Oklahoma’s municipalities, including mandatory insurance 52
and vicarious liability for drivers in the course of employment. 53
Because the Motor Carrier Act of 1995 does not include rideshare
drivers, the Oklahoma legislature has imposed somewhat more relaxed
regulations. The OTNC Services Act requires ridesharing services to
maintain “primary automobile insurance” that covers the driver during one
of two periods: “(1) While the driver is both logged on to and available to
receive transportation requests on the . . . digital network; or (2) While the
46. Id.
47. 47 OKLA. STAT. § 1010 (Supp. 2019).
48. See id. § 1012; see also MORAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 29 (first citing S.B. 14-125,
69th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2014); and then citing S.B. 396, 64th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Mont. 2015)).
49. 47 OKLA. STAT. § 1012.
50. Id.
51. 47 OKLA. STAT. § 230.23(6)(a) (2011).
52. See, e.g., Graves v. Harrington, 60 P.2d 622, 625 (Okla. 1936) (explaining that the
city ordinance at issue “requires insurance against liability”).
53. See Dixie Cab Co. v. Sanders, 1955 OK 150, ¶ 10, 284 P.2d 421, 424; Safeway Cab
Co. v. McConnell, 1938 OK 2, ¶¶ 3–4, 75 P.2d 884, 885.
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driver is engaged in providing prearranged rides.” 54 The Genzer case
involved coverage during the former period. 55 The OTNC Services Act
allows for ridesharing services to maintain insurance when an outside
company would not provide it. 56 Finally, the Act also allows surplus lines
insurers (such as James River) to provide policies. 57
2. Uninsured Motorist (UM) Coverage in Oklahoma
As with all auto insurance policies in Oklahoma, UM coverage is
required by law for ridesharing services “where not waived” pursuant to
Oklahoma’s UM statute.58 Title 36, section 3636 of the Oklahoma Statutes
governs this coverage. UM coverage takes effect when an insured driver
brings forward a claim for “bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including
death” resulting from “owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and
hit-and-run motor vehicles.”59
The UM statute requires policies “issued, delivered, renewed, or
extended” in Oklahoma, to “motor vehicle[s] registered or principally
garaged” in Oklahoma, to have UM coverage. 60 Yet, the statute also allows
insureds to reject or waive UM coverage entirely, or select lower liability
limits, at the mercy of the insurer.61 It is important to carefully read the
policy language that fits the UM statute, particularly since Oklahoma courts
have based their opinions on specific exclusions and whether they
contravene the UM statute’s public policy for Oklahoma.62
This focus on specific exclusions encompasses a wide range of issues.
For example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed a denial of UM
coverage for a vehicle principally garaged and driven in Texas because
Oklahoma’s UM statute specifically applied to cars “registered or
principally garaged in” Oklahoma. 63 On the other hand, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court affirmed a trial court verdict allowing UM benefits to be
54. 47 OKLA. STAT. § 1025(A)(1)–(2) (Supp. 2019).
55. Id. § 1025(B)(1); see Genzer v. James River Ins. Co., 934 F.3d 1156, 1159 (10th
Cir. 2019) (stating that the accident at issue occurred while Genzer, an Uber driver, was
returning from dropping off a passenger).
56. 47 OKLA. STAT. § 1025(D)–(E).
57. Id. § 1025(F).
58. Id. § 1025(B)(2).
59. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 3636(B) (Supp. 2019).
60. Id. § 3636(A).
61. Id. § 3636(G).
62. See Dawn M. Goeres, Oklahoma’s Uninsured Motorist Coverage Statute – An
Overview, 88 OKLA. BAR J. 1951, 1951–52 (2017).
63. Bernal v. Charter Cty. Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 OK 28, ¶¶ 13–14, 209 P.3d 309, 316.
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“stacked”64 when another state’s law, and the terms of the policy, permit it,
even if Oklahoma law does not.65 Looking at the UM statute and the terms
of the policy in tandem is crucial to understanding whether a given policy
violates Oklahoma law.
3. Surplus Lines Coverage in Oklahoma
Another type of insurance coverage applicable to ridesharing services is
surplus lines coverage, which covers risks not included in conventional
policies. In Oklahoma, surplus lines insurers operate through licensees and
brokers “on properties, risks or exposures located or to be performed in a
state allowing non-admitted insurers to do business.”66 These groups can
place the coverage with a surplus lines insurer “[i]f a particular insurance
coverage or type, class, or kind of coverage is not readily procurable from
authorized insurers in Oklahoma.” 67 Insurance contracts that are
“effectuated by a surplus lines insurer” in violation of Oklahoma law are
voidable unless the insured says otherwise. 68 Oklahoma maintains a list of
surplus lines insurers that are eligible to operate in the state; the Oklahoma
Insurance Commission has named James River as an approved surplus lines
insurer.69
4. “Mend the Hold”
Understanding Genzer also requires an explanation of a long-standing
jurisprudential relic known as “mend the hold” doctrine. This theory
formed one of the central arguments in Genzer’s case. 70 First advanced by
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1877, “mend the hold” doctrine was affirmed in
principle by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in 1906.71 Quoting the U.S.
Supreme Court case, the language of this theory is as follows: “Where a
party gives a reason for his conduct and decision touching anything
64. See Goeres, supra note 62, at 1952 (defining stacking as “a situation in which
multiple vehicles are identified on a policy and the insured pays separate UM premiums for
each, thereby permitting the insured to recover the UM limit for each listed vehicle rather
than the single UM limit identified on the policy”).
65. Leritz v. Farmers Ins. Co., 2016 OK 79, ¶¶ 3–4, 385 P.3d 991, 993.
66. 36 OKLA. STAT. § 1100.1(10) (2011).
67. Id. § 1108.
68. Id. § 1102.
69. Company Type: Surplus Lines, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS, https://sbs.naic.org/
solar-external-lookup/lookup/company/summary/44197344?jurisdiction=OK (last visited
Jan. 15, 2021).
70. Genzer v. James River Ins. Co, 934 F.3d 1156, 1158 (10th Cir. 2019).
71. Morrison v. Atkinson, 1906 OK 25, 85 P. 472.
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involved in a controversy, he cannot, after litigation has begun, change his
ground, and put his conduct upon another and a different consideration. He
is not permitted thus to mend his hold.”72
Fundamentally, “mend the hold” fits two doctrinal spectra. In the
procedural context, by barring defenses to be raised in litigation, it brushes
up against the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 73 In the more accepted
substantive context, it limits contracting parties to statements made before
litigation. 74
The Seventh Circuit case Harbor Insurance Co. v. Continental Bank
Corp. is an oft-cited example of “mend the hold” as applied to insurance
claims.75 Harbor involved a coverage denial by Harbor Insurance Company
and Allstate Insurance Company, which provided liability insurance for
Continental Bank’s directors and officers. 76 Harbor and Allstate initially
denied coverage for the defendant directors’ “egregious” behavior, but then
filed a counterclaim, stating there was no misconduct.77 As such, Harbor
and Allstate changed their defense theory midway through litigation.78
In an opinion written by Judge Posner, the court held this inconsistent
denial created a question of fact, and that “mend the hold” formed part of
the insurer’s duty of good faith and fair dealing in treating its claim. 79 Judge
Posner agreed with the bank that “one might suppose that the insurance
companies owed their insured a fuller inquiry before denying liability on
what proved to be an untenable ground” when the insurance companies

72. Id. ¶ 8, 85 P. at 473 (emphasis added) (quoting Ohio & Miss. Ry. Co. v. McCarthy,
96 U.S. 258, 267–68 (1877)).
73. See Harbor Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 364 (7th Cir. 1990)
(observing that the “mend the hold” doctrine “embodies an antithetical conception of the
litigation process, one in which a party is expected to have all his pins in perfect order when
he files his first pleading” because, in contrast, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a
party to state “as many separate claims or defenses as the party has regardless of
consistency” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)(2)).
74. See Robert H. Sitkoff, Comment, “Mend the Hold” and Erie: Why an Obscure
Contracts Doctrine Should Control in Federal Diversity Cases, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1059,
1068–69 (1998) (“Over the last fifty years, courts applying the laws of Delaware, the District
of Columbia, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oregon,
Tennessee, Texas, and Vermont have enforced this version of the doctrine either by name or
in practice at least once.”).
75. 922 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1990).
76. Id. at 359.
77. Id. at 359–60.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 362–63.
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defended the counterclaim; Harbor and Allstate could not “mend the[ir]
hold.”80
In Harbor, the Seventh Circuit also addressed concerns about the reach
of “mend the hold” by interpreting it in two ways. On one hand, when
viewed in a procedural manner, Judge Posner’s opinion expressed concern
that “mend the hold” would conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and force litigants to “have all their pins in order” before
asserting defenses. 81 On the other hand, courts in Illinois (Harbor’s
jurisdiction) applied “mend the hold” as a doctrine that “estops a contract
party to change the ground on which he has refused to perform the contract,
whether or not it was a ground stated in a pleading, or otherwise in the
course of litigation.”82 This contractual version of “mend the hold” has
since applied to the insurance law arena in Oklahoma (although not
explicitly by name) as an intersection between the nuances of insurance
contract law and an insurer’s duty of good faith and fair dealing in treating
an insured’s claim. 83
The seminal “mend the hold” case in Oklahoma is Buzzard v. Farmers
Insurance Co. In Buzzard, Farmers’s adjusters sought to introduce evidence
that its insured was speeding. 84 Farmers presented this novel theory despite
initially encouraging its insureds to settle with a liability carrier, only to
deny coverage after the fact.85 Put another way by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, the comparative negligence defense “was neither internally noted by
Farmers nor communicated to plaintiffs as a reason for delay or denial of
the claim.”86 The court also stated Farmers could not rely on testimony
from an accident reconstructionist in support of denying the claim because
the evaluation happened after Farmers’s denial.87
Buzzard ultimately forbade Farmers from introducing evidence of its
insured’s negligence without having communicated its intent to the
insured’s decedents before litigation started. 88 Based on this precedent,
Oklahoma courts do not permit an insurer to “mend the hold.” In Genzer,
James River makes a similar shift in theories between initial representation
80. Id. at 364.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 1991 OK 127, ¶¶ 11–17, 824 P.2d 1105,
1108–10; Brown v. Patel, 2007 OK 16, ¶¶ 12–13, 157 P.3d 117, 122–23.
84. Buzzard, ¶¶ 15–17, 824 P.2d at 1109–10.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. ¶ 43, 824 P.2d at 1114.
88. Id. ¶ 17, 824 P.2d at 1110.
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to its insured and its theory in litigation, but the court did not specifically
apply Buzzard’s precedent to Genzer’s facts.
III. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
On April 17, 2017, Uber driver Bonni Genzer picked up a passenger at
Will Rogers World Airport in Oklahoma City and drove him nearly 140
miles to Woodward.89 During Genzer’s return drive to Oklahoma City, a
large metal object fell from a semi-trailer truck and smashed through her
windshield. 90 After the accident, Genzer made a claim for UM coverage
benefits to James River, Uber’s insurer, on May 3, 2017.91 She asserted she
was using the UberPartner application while on her return journey. 92
The major issue in Genzer was whether one of the driver’s two James
River policies (issued through Uber) applied to her incident. The first
policy, known as the “100 Policy,” applies when an Uber driver logged into
UberPartner is either en route to pick up a passenger or is on public airport
premises.93 The other, the “200 Policy,” covers “Period 1,” when an Uber
driver logged in to the application is available for requests but has not yet
accepted a ride.94 Only the “100 Policy” allowed for UM coverage at the
time of incident.95 Yet, a James River claims examiner initially used the
“200 Policy” to disclaim Genzer’s coverage instead, despite Genzer
admitting she waived that coverage.96
In back-and-forth correspondence between the examiner and Genzer’s
counsel, the examiner reiterated that Genzer was not logged into the
UberPartner application at the time of the incident. 97 When Genzer asserted
she was online and seeking a fare, James River’s claims examiner replied
that “available or offline, there isn’t coverage” for her injuries or any
vehicle damage. 98
89. Genzer v. James River Ins. Co., No. CIV-17-855-SLP, 2018 WL 11240482, at *1,
*6 (W.D. Okla. June 4, 2018) (granting summary judgment to James River and denying
partial summary judgment to Genzer).
90. Id. at *1.
91. Genzer v. James River Ins. Co., 934 F.3d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 2019).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1158.
94. Id. at 1159.
95. Id. at 1161.
96. Id. at 1161 & n.11.
97. Id. at 1159.
98. Id. at 1160.
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Ultimately, James River denied the claim on the sole basis that Genzer
had not been logged into the UberPartner application at the time of injury—
leaving open the question of whether Genzer operated a covered “auto”
under the “100 Policy.”99
B. Procedural History
After James River denied Genzer’s benefits, she filed a breach of
contract suit in Blaine County District Court.100 Along with the coverage
issue, Genzer argued “mend the hold” was applicable. 101 Since James River
asserted the defense that Genzer was offline at the time of the incident, it
waived any possibility of asserting the defense that she was not operating a
covered “auto” at the time of the incident. 102 James River subsequently
removed the case to the Western District of Oklahoma. 103 James River then
filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Genzer did not
have coverage, albeit not relying on Genzer’s “alleged offline status.”104
Genzer filed a motion for partial summary judgment the same day, claiming
coverage under a “100 Policy” provision endorsement—subpart (a)(2)—for
“traveling to the final destination[s] of the requested transportation services
including, but not limited to, dropping-off of passenger(s).”105
The Western District of Oklahoma subsequently granted James River’s
motion and denied Genzer’s.106 The order found Morrison v. Atkinson and
“mend the hold” inapplicable, because it did not believe James River had
“taken opposite positions on the same issue during this litigation.” 107 The
order also asserted the main policy provision Genzer called ambiguous—
“traveling to the final destination[s] of the requested transportation services
including, but not limited to, dropping-off of passenger(s)”—was not
ambiguous after all. 108 In the trial court’s view, “[a] passenger who hires a
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Genzer v. James River Ins. Co., No. CIV-17-855-SLP, 2018 WL 11240482, at *5
(W.D. Okla. June 4, 2018).
102. Id. Genzer argued that “an insurance company must decide which defenses apply
and assert those when it denies a claim. In doing so, all other defenses that the insurance
company knew of at the time it denied the claim are waived.” Id. (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
103. Genzer, 934 F.3d at 1160.
104. Id. at 1163.
105. Id. at 1158, 1167.
106. Id. at 1160.
107. Genzer, 2018 WL 11240482, at *5–*6.
108. Id. at *3–*4.
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driver via Uber surely does not care where the driver goes after dropping
the passenger off at his or her desired destination.” 109 The court only briefly
addressed Oklahoma’s UM statute and James River’s “200 Policy” in a
footnote, calling both irrelevant to Genzer’s cause of action. 110
IV. The Tenth Circuit’s Decision—A Strict Approach
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court order granting
summary judgment to James River.111 Genzer’s issues, as interpreted by the
Tenth Circuit, were (1) whether “mend the hold” applied in Oklahoma as
asserted by Genzer, and (2) whether the covered auto endorsement of the
“100 Policy” was ambiguous. 112 The Tenth Circuit concluded that neither
was the case, rejecting Genzer’s claim for coverage. 113
The Tenth Circuit started its analysis by first examining whether “mend
the hold” applies to James River’s differing rationale for denying coverage
during litigation.114 It asserted James River shifted its rationale simply
because it “tracked Genzer’s shifting theory of coverage.”115 In the Tenth
Circuit’s view, the “200 Policy” applied to the facts “as Genzer had recited
them” in her initial representation to James River because she “had been
‘available’ for ride requests.”116 Yet, Genzer’s actual suit invoked the “100
Policy,” and she stated in her complaint that “she had in fact been
‘providing’ transportation services.” 117 Without addressing the subtle
difference between “available for” and “providing” ride requests, the court
ends by saying “[t]he mend-the-hold doctrine’s applicability in these
circumstances is unlikely in any jurisdiction.” 118
Next, the Tenth Circuit seemed to question whether “mend the hold”
applies in Oklahoma at all, citing an unpublished Eastern District of
Oklahoma case and its appeal in the circuit.119 The Tenth Circuit interpreted
Morrison’s mention of “mend the hold” as part of the overarching contract
109. Id. at *4.
110. Id. at *2 n.4.
111. Genzer, 934 F.3d at 1158.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1169.
114. Id. at 1160–61.
115. Id. at 1163.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1164 & n.20 (first citing Fry v. Am. Home Assurance Co., No. CIV-14-131RAW, 2015 WL 519706, at *2 (E.D. Okla. Feb. 9, 2015); and then citing Fry v. Am. Home
Assurance Co., 636 F. App’x 764, 766 (10th Cir. 2016)).
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rule that “arguments not asserted at trial are waived on appeal.”120 Ergo, the
“mend the hold” doctrine does not bar parties from switching rationales
during litigation entirely. 121 Even though the Tenth Circuit noted that
several cases after Morrison use “mend the hold” language, it stated the
Oklahoma Supreme Court “has never endorsed the doctrine as a constraint
on an alleged nonperforming party in a breach-of-contract action changing
its prelitigation defenses.”122 The Tenth Circuit then set aside the cases that
Genzer cited using the prelitigation “mend the hold” doctrine, including
Buzzard,123 by saying the court does not explicitly invoke it, stating:
Any resemblance [to the precedents Genzer cites] is irrelevant,
though, because Genzer does not allege that James River initially
denied coverage in bad faith. In fact, she seeks to limit James
River to its prelitigation denial irrespective of its good-faith basis
for that denial. Such an absolute bar to changing positions is
plainly incongruous with a conception of the mend-the-hold
doctrine rooted in the duty of good faith. 124
James River’s denial of coverage, in the Tenth Circuit’s view, was not in
bad faith; it seemingly gave “fair notice” of its rationale during litigation—
citing the unpublished Fry v. American Home Assurance Co. appellate
opinion as its primary metric for “mend the hold.”125 The court also
assumed that because James River “continues to argue that Genzer had
been offline . . . even as it argues that she had already completed the
accepted services,” James River was maintaining “additional, consistent
defenses to contract performance” in its denial of Genzer’s coverage. 126
The Tenth Circuit accused Genzer of relying on extra-jurisdictional
authority in citing cases such as Harbor, adding that “Oklahoma courts
haven’t seen fit to adopt” the doctrine. 127 Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit’s
conclusion, that applying “mend the hold” in Genzer “would be
120. Id. at 1164.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1164–65.
123. See supra Section II.B.4 (discussing this case’s applicability to “mend the hold” in
Oklahoma).
124. Genzer, 934 F.3d at 1165.
125. Id. at 1166 (stating that, according to the Fry opinion, “the mend the hold doctrine
‘seems to require only fair notice of the theory for denying coverage’”) (citing Fry v. Am.
Home Assurance Co., 636 F. App’x 764, 766 (10th Cir. 2016))).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1165 (noting Genzer’s reliance on Harbor Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 922
F.2d 357, 363 (7th Cir. 1990)).
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unreasonable to the point of absurdity,” relied on language from another
Seventh Circuit case.128
In its analysis of Genzer’s breach of contract issue, the Tenth Circuit
strictly construed the “100 Policy.” Specifically, the court looked at the
policy’s covered-auto endorsement provision of “traveling to the final
destination of the requested transportation services including, but not
limited to, dropping-off of passenger(s).”129 It upheld the district court’s
view of this provision: Genzer’s coverage ended at the final destination of
the passenger, not that of the driver, regardless of the distance. 130 A
different result would theoretically mean that “after accepting a single ride
request, a driver would continue occupying a ‘covered auto’ throughout her
travels, even when offline and driving for strictly personal reasons.”131 This
would go beyond the “discrete stages of the ridesharing process” instituted
in the provision. 132 The court ended its analysis by citing another provision
of the “100 Policy” where, “immediately following the conclusion of the
requested transportation services,” the policy covers the driver “while in the
course of exiting [airport premises].”133 In the court’s view, then, the
coverage omission for cases like Genzer’s was “deliberate.”134
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit concluded the Genzer opinion by stating
“there is no ambiguity to construe in Genzer’s favor . . . Though we
sympathize with Genzer’s misfortune and injuries, this outcome is dictated
by the covered-auto endorsement’s plain terms.”135
V. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Genzer constricts the policy to the
plainest terms and confuses the issues. The court’s flat rejection of “mend
the hold” in Oklahoma does not account for that doctrine’s complex
intersection with contract and tort law. Further, the court places too much
weight on the language of James River’s insurance policy prima facie. In
doing so, it failed to account for James River’s history of issuing policies
contravening Oklahoma law, the “reasonable expectations” doctrine
governing Oklahoma insurance contracts, and the novel nature of Uber as a
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 1156 (citing Ryerson Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 676 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2012)).
Id. at 1167.
Id. at 1168.
Id. at 1169.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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service. By taking James River at its word, the Genzer decision ultimately
furthers a detrimental public policy, not just in giving insurers the benefit of
the doubt in switching rationales for denying coverage, but in refusing to
close a regulatory loophole for ridesharing services.
A. No More “Mend the Hold” in Oklahoma?
While Oklahoma courts have not applied “mend the hold” by name, they
frequently apply its principles, phrased as a sort of cousin to equitable
estoppel.136 Both the district court’s order and Tenth Circuit’s opinion cast
doubt on the “mend the hold” doctrine’s application in insurance, and the
Tenth Circuit’s opinion erred further in failing to consider Oklahoma’s
precedent on the matter. Insurers owe insureds a tort duty of good faith and
fair dealing in handling claims such as Genzer’s, and Oklahoma courts have
extended this tort duty to an insurer’s contractual duty as well.137
Besides resorting to unpublished cases in saying “mend the hold” does
not apply in Oklahoma by name, 138 the Tenth Circuit seems to misinterpret
the Seventh Circuit’s Harbor case governing “mend the hold” as applied to
Genzer’s case:
Of course, the analysis is different for during-litigation positional
shifts. A party that asserts one defense to contract performance
in response to the complaint, then when that defense fails asserts
a different defense—even a consistent one—might be attempting
unfairly to take a better hold. But here, James River . . . denied
coverage before litigation based on Genzer’s factual account,
then asserted different grounds for denial in response to the
complaint.139
Yet, the Tenth Circuit seems to neglect the clear distinction in Harbor
between procedural “mend the hold,” which bars parties from switching
litigation defenses, and contractual “mend the hold,” which bars parties
from switching grounds for contract denial. 140 It is admittedly a subtle
difference, but a key one. Genzer never attempted to stop James River from
136. See supra Section II.B.4.
137. Christian v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 1977 OK 141, ¶¶ 6, 25, 577 P.2d 899, 901,
904–05 (“Breach of the duty sounds in tort, notwithstanding that it also constitutes a breach
of contract . . . .”).
138. See supra Part IV.
139. Genzer, 934 F.3d at 1166 n.25 (citing Harbor v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357,
363 (7th Cir. 1990)).
140. See Harbor, 922 F.2d at 364 (explaining the difference between the procedural and
substantive (i.e., contractual) versions of “mend the hold”).
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asserting the defense that she did not operate a covered “auto.” In using
“mend the hold,” she attempted to stop James River from asserting different
grounds for denial than those already communicated to her.
As with Farmers in Buzzard,141 James River decided to change its theory
midway through litigation to assert a different reason for denying its
contract performance. In Buzzard, Farmers could not introduce evidence
obtained after the beginning of litigation to present a new theory denying
liability for its insured.142 Similarly, James River should not have been
allowed to explicitly say “available or offline, there isn’t coverage” without
having communicated to Genzer why there was no coverage. The Tenth
Circuit even implicitly said as much in footnote 16 of the opinion:
[E]ven accepting James River’s interpretation [that uninsuredmotorist coverage was available and that a different policy was
being discussed], it doesn’t explain why James River disclaimed
coverage. The phrase “available or offline, there isn’t coverage”
states only the conclusion that there isn’t coverage, not why there
isn’t coverage. It certainly does not contemplate James River’s
current rationale for denying coverage, i.e., that Genzer had
already dropped off her passenger before the accident. The
rationale that there isn’t coverage whether Genzer was “available
or offline” doesn’t admit of such a specific meaning. 143
Footnote 23 of the opinion also serves as an extreme example of strict
construction in acknowledging why “mend the hold” would not apply here.
The Tenth Circuit stated that Genzer acknowledged an inherent difference
between bad faith and “mend the hold,” simply because her reply brief used
the word “or” in describing the two. 144 Perhaps the Tenth Circuit aimed to
nullify the precedents Genzer brought forth to show that modern “mend the
hold” forms part of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, even if “mend
the hold” was never mentioned by name in the body of the case.
At any rate, the differences alleged by the Tenth Circuit amount to little
more than semantics. The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s language in Buzzard
141. See Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co., 1991 OK 127, ¶¶ 13–18, 824 P.2d 1105, 1109–10
(stating that the insurance company raised a defense that was neither “internally noted by
[the insurance company] nor communicated to plaintiffs as a reason for delay or denial of
[plaintiffs’] claim”).
142. Id.
143. Genzer, 934 F.3d at 1162 n.16.
144. Id. at 1165 n.23 (stating that Genzer “[used] the disjunctive ‘or’ to distinguish ‘a bad
faith theory or a mend-the-hold theory’”).
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necessarily implied “mend the hold” in an insurance bad faith claim.
According to the Buzzard court, an “insurer must conduct an investigation
reasonably appropriate under the circumstances,” centering the inquiry on
“[t]he knowledge and belief of the insurer during the time period the claim
is being reviewed.”145
As such, before the Genzer decision, an insurer was not permitted to
“mend its hold.” Yet, the Genzer decision throws this precedent into doubt,
despite the Tenth Circuit previously upholding Buzzard as good law several
months prior to the Genzer decision.146 Unlike the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in Buzzard, the Tenth Circuit in Genzer allowed the insurer to say it
denied its insurer’s claim for a different reason than it had initially
expressed to its insured.
B. James River’s Insurance Policies and Oklahoma Law
Genzer also failed to address some major ambiguities in Oklahoma’s
insurance law that have become increasingly important with the rise of
ridesharing. The Genzer opinion does not mention any Oklahoma insurance
statutes applicable to waiving UM coverage or surplus lines coverage, even
though the case’s claims indirectly raise both issues. The district court’s
order brushed off the nuances involving Genzer’s UM coverage waiver
with the following footnote: “Because Plaintiff does not claim a violation of
this statute (if she could do so in a civil action), the statute is irrelevant to
the issues before the Court.”147 Outside of a brief mention that James River
disclaimed its “200 Policy” coverage, 148 the Tenth Circuit’s opinion does
not mention this issue at all.
Of course, conventional insurers still express a degree of wariness
towards ridesharing’s distinct risks. A 2015 report by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) stated that personal
auto insurance carriers’ concerns about ridesharing included, inter alia,
“[c]onfusion regarding which insurer has a duty to defend,” and which
insurer has a duty to indemnify. 149 This confusion arises from the unique
145. Buzzard, ¶ 14, 824 P.2d at 1109.
146. Thomas v. Farmers Ins. Co., 774 F. App’x 430, 432 (10th Cir. 2019) (“[E]vidence
that supports a post-denial rationalization, rather than the evidence that the insurance
company actually relied on when initially denying a claim, is inadmissible under Buzzard.”).
147. Genzer v. James River Ins. Co., No. CIV-17-855-SLP, 2018 WL 11240482, at *2
n.4 (W.D. Okla. June 4, 2018).
148. Genzer, 934 F.3d at 1163.
149. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANY INSURANCE
PRINCIPLES FOR LEGISLATORS AND REGULATORS 8 (2015), https://www.naic.org/prod_serv/
TNC-OP-15.pdf.
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way ridesharing services use surplus lines coverage; in addition to insuring
the ridesharing company’s risks, the surplus lines carrier also covers any
losses “resulting from the [ridesharing] drivers using their personal
autos.”150
In theory, the surplus lines carrier’s allocation of risks from the
ridesharing company and its drivers should make the coverage operate in
tandem with the drivers’ personal policies. Yet, again, this is usually not the
case.151 The NAIC urged regulators and legislators to “consider requiring
UM [coverage] in the same amount as liability coverage” for ridesharing. 152
In a similar vein, the NAIC warned that omitting UM coverage would leave
“a passenger injured in an accident caused by an uninsured . . . motorist . . .
without recourse.”153
The Oklahoma statute fits the NAIC’s standard. It states that, “while a
[ridesharing] driver is both logged on to the [ridesharing company]’s digital
network and available to receive transportation requests but is not engaged
in prearranged rides”—in other words, “Period 1”—there must be “[UM]
coverage where not waived.”154 The Oklahoma ridesharing statute also
implicitly acknowledges the complicated nature of Uber’s insurance policy
by allowing for insurance “with an insurer authorized to do business in this
state or with a surplus lines insurer eligible under [the surplus lines
statute].”155 As such, neither the district court’s order, nor the Tenth
Circuit’s opinion, raised the issue that James River, as a surplus lines
insurer, is not licensed to sell policies in Oklahoma.
The Northern District of Oklahoma, however, explicitly recognized this
issue in another case involving a James River policy with terms that might
potentially contradict Oklahoma law on waiving an insurance policy.
Although the district court in that case ultimately ruled in James River’s
favor,156 the statute and waiver involved share some key differences with
the UM and ridesharing statutes at issue in Genzer.
In James River Insurance Co. v. Blue Ox Dance Hall, LLC, the insurer
sued for declaratory judgment against a night club and its owners on the

150. Id. at 9.
151. See supra Part I.
152. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 149, at 17.
153. Id.
154. 47 OKLA. STAT. § 1025(B)(2) (Supp. 2019).
155. Id. § 1025(F).
156. James River Ins. Co. v. Blue Ox Dance Hall, LLC (Blue Ox I), No. 16-CV-0151CVE-FHM, 2017 WL 2367052, at *8 (N.D. Okla. May 31, 2017).
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grounds that a provision in its liability policy was valid.157 The policy
provision at issue, called “defense within limits,” allowed James River to
deduct claims expenses and defense costs from the assault and battery
coverage limit on its premium. 158 Blue Ox argued the deductions violated
an Oklahoma statute that prohibited defense costs from being included
within the limits of liability of any insurance policy “made, issued, or
delivered by any insurer or by any agent” operating within the state. 159
James River’s motion for partial summary judgment in Blue Ox I
asserted, rather strikingly, that its status as a surplus lines carrier gave it the
ability to include a provision contrary to Oklahoma law. 160 The court opted
to defer a ruling and have James River brief the issue more fully in a second
motion.161 After James River briefed a second motion for partial summary
judgment, the court dismissed the case. 162 The court cited the Oklahoma
Insurance Commissioner’s waiver, which stated that preventing an insurer
from including a “defense within limits” provision otherwise contrary to
Oklahoma law would “cause a market availability problem for the persons
or risks covered by such insurance policies, forcing consumers to obtain
coverage from non-admitted insurers.”163
The Oklahoma ridesharing statute does implicitly acknowledge the
complicated nature of Uber’s insurance policy by allowing for insurance
“with an insurer authorized to do business in this state or with a surplus
lines insurer eligible under [the surplus lines statute].”164 Of course, the
risks of ridesharing are indeed distinct from those in a conventional
insurance policy.165 Yet, this discrepancy does not reconcile James River’s
disclaimer of coverage, even if the facts do not allege any impropriety with
a coverage waiver.

157. Id. at *1.
158. James River Ins. Co. v. Blue Ox Dance Hall, LLC (Blue Ox II), No. 16-CV-0151CVE-FHM, 2017 WL 5195877, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 1, 2017).
159. Blue Ox I, 2017 WL 2367052, at *6 (citing OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 365:15-1-15
(2020)).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Blue Ox II, 2017 WL 5195877, at *4.
163. Id.
164. 47 OKLA. STAT. § 1025(F) (Supp. 2019).
165. See Commercial Ride-Sharing, supra note 10 (“Ride-sharing is different, however,
than taking a traditional taxi or limousine. Taxis and limousines are typically licensed by the
state and/or local transportation authority. . . . [Ride-Sharers] may not be subject to the same
requirements that apply to taxis and limousines.”).
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For example, James River’s “200 Policy” allowed for UM coverage in
Kansas, but not Oklahoma, without explanation as to why. 166 While the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has acknowledged the UM statute’s “legislative
intent . . . could arguably be satisfied with the acceptance of UM insurance
with agreed-upon exclusions from coverage,”167 this premise relies on the
policyholder’s decision to accept or reject UM coverage. 168 As such, the
court has repeatedly voided comparable insurance policy provisions
“[purporting] to condition, limit, or dilute” coverage in violation of the UM
statute, from insurers licensed to do business in the state. 169
Surplus lines coverage does fit an important niche in insurance law. It
should not, however, give insurers free reign to introduce policies that
contradict Oklahoma law, at least without arguing their exclusion would, in
a similar vein to the Blue Ox II case, cause a “market availability problem”
for Uber and other ridesharing services. 170
C. “Unambiguous” Terms and “Reasonable Expectations”
Insurance contracts, like Genzer and James River’s, are considered
contracts of adhesion because of the disproportionate bargaining power
between two parties.171 Oklahoma courts must, therefore, construe any
ambiguities in insurance contracts against the insurer. 172 Even though the
Tenth Circuit called James River’s policy exclusions unambiguous on their
face, 173 the devil is in the details. The footnotes accompanying the opinion’s
rationale for strict construction seem to preclude summary judgment. Given
Uber’s history with insurance coverage, the Tenth Circuit’s construction
does not sit well with one of Oklahoma’s major contract law doctrines.
According to the Tenth Circuit in Genzer, “[The James River policy]
plainly defines coverage as being coterminous with a passenger’s
‘requested transportation services,’ which conclude when the passenger
reaches his or her ‘final destination’ and fully exits the vehicle with his or
her belongings.”174 The court further stated that to “construe the

166. Genzer v. James River Ins. Co., 934 F.3d 1156, 1162 n.15 (10th Cir. 2019).
167. Ball v. Wilshire Ins. Co., 2009 OK 38, ¶ 28, 221 P.3d 717, 727.
168. Id.
169. Brown v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 1984 OK 55, ¶ 6, 684 P.2d 1195, 1198
(collecting cases).
170. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
171. Wilson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 1980 OK 9, ¶ 8, 605 P.2d 1327, 1329.
172. Id.
173. Genzer v. James River Ins. Co., 934 F.3d 1156, 1167 (10th Cir. 2019).
174. Id.
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passenger’s ‘requested transportation services’ as somehow including the
driver’s destination” would also be illogical.175
Yet, the Tenth Circuit’s construction of James River’s policy language
clashes with Oklahoma’s contract law precedent, particularly the
“reasonable expectations” doctrine. In the case Max True Plastering Co. v.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., the Oklahoma Supreme Court
adopted the “reasonable expectations” doctrine, which provides that any
ambiguities creating a “reasonable expectation of coverage in the insured”
must be viewed as including that expectation.176 The Genzer decision did
cite Max True for its provision that “insurance contracts are ambiguous
only if they are susceptible to two constructions,” 177 but failed to consider
the true reach of Max True’s holding.
Max True also encompassed “contracts containing unexpected exclusions
arising from technical or obscure language or which are hidden in policy
provisions.”178 Arguably, James River’s initial and subsequent rationales
for its exclusion of Genzer’s coverage both fit this sphere. James River’s
bare statement in its initial denial—that “available or offline, there isn’t
coverage”—served as a conclusion without a rationale. 179
The Tenth Circuit’s strict construction of “requested transportation
services,”180 however, seems to fit right in line with Uber’s original policy
not to provide insurance coverage during the time between requests. 181
Indeed, Uber’s policy before the Liu case182 targeted an even narrower
window, with “providing services” meaning the time when a driver had
passengers in her car.183 This creates a problem, because a ride request
cannot be fulfilled if the driver has not logged in to the Uber app.184 The
driver would effectively have been “offline” at this time, creating a
coverage gap.
The Tenth Circuit’s construction of these terms in Genzer seems to
provide a similar result. It appears “unexpected” to not account for Uber’s
checkered regulatory history or an Uber driver’s availability to take
175. Id. at 1168 (emphasis added).
176. 1996 OK 28, ¶¶ 8, 24, 912 P.2d 861, 864–65, 870.
177. Genzer, 934 F.3d at 1167 (citing Max True, ¶ 20, 912 P.2d at 869).
178. Max True, ¶ 17, 912 P.2d at 868.
179. Genzer, 934 F.3d at 1162 & n.16.
180. See supra Section III.B, Part IV.
181. See Genzer, 934 F.3d at 1168; Lieber, supra note 7.
182. See supra Section II.A.
183. See Lieber, supra note 7.
184. See Emily Dobson, Transportation Network Companies: How Should South
Carolina Adjust Its Regulatory Framework?, 66 S.C. L. REV. 701, 706–07 (2015).
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requests during a return drive. As such, the Tenth Circuit erred by not
reading the James River policy’s provisions in line with the “reasonable
expectation” that Genzer would have received coverage for her injury while
returning from a passenger drop-off.
D. The Tenth Circuit’s Decision Furthers a Detrimental Public Policy
The Tenth Circuit’s strict construction of Genzer’s policy sets back
regulators’ efforts to rein in ridesharing. Even if the problems of UM
coverage, ineffective surplus lines coverage, and Oklahoma’s ridesharing
statute were not raised as potential issues in Genzer, the facts implicate all
three and would, in tandem, undermine the language in James River’s
insurance policy as the Tenth Circuit reads it.
Just as transportation regulations are a state law issue, so, too, is
insurance (and perhaps even on the municipal level, particularly in cases
where state law preempts municipal law). 185 Yet, just because Uber, Lyft,
and other ridesharing services began their operation outside of the normal
regulatory scheme does not give them free reign to hire insurers that operate
on a lesser standard.
Uber itself argued as much when it sued another one of its surplus lines
insurers, Evanston Insurance Company, for bad faith based on the policy at
issue in the Liu case.186 In the resulting case, Evanston Insurance Co. v.
Uber Technologies, Inc., the Northern District of California denied
Evanston’s motion to dismiss Uber’s bad faith claim. 187 Evanston argued its
policy only applied to Uber’s business, and not “any loss resulting from
automobile use away from Uber’s office buildings,” and further argued
Uber’s payment of reformation “somehow forfeited [its] right to allege a
bad faith claim.”188 The Northern District of California called Evanston’s
application “absurd,” stating its policy “would only apply to car accidents
occurring in the hallways of Uber office buildings.”189 It also stated Uber’s
reformation did not create an issue, explaining “the written terms
themselves” were the basis of the alleged bad faith denial. 190
185. See supra Part I; Eliana Dockterman, Uber and Lyft Are Leaving Austin After
Losing Background Check Vote, FORTUNE (May 8, 2016, 2:02 PM CDT), https://fortune.
com/2016/05/08/uber-lyft-leaving-austin/; Douglas MacMillan & Lisa Fleisher, How SharpElbowed Uber Is Trying to Make Nice, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2015, 10:33 PM ET),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/hard-driving-uber-gives-compromise-a-try-1422588782.
186. See supra Section II.A.
187. No. C 15-03988 WHA, 2015 WL 8597239, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2015).
188. Id. at *3–4.
189. Id. at *3.
190. Id. at *4.
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From California to Oklahoma, it seems Uber has not learned from its
attack on Evanston’s insurance policy. Uber’s service might very well be
one-size-fits-all, but that should not factor into the creation of similarly
uniform insurance policies. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit’s strict analysis in
Genzer proves harmful. Courts should look far more carefully at insurance
policy exclusions such as James River’s.
VI. Conclusion
At first blush, Genzer might seem like a simple insurance law case
upholding a policy exclusion, particularly when divorced from the
circumstances surrounding the case. But as the first federal appellate court
case to tackle policy exclusions put forward by an insurer of a ridesharing
company, Genzer sets a precedent of strict construction that gives insurers
too much deference in this emerging area of litigation.
Genzer also casts uncertainty on the longstanding “mend the hold”
contract doctrine’s application in Oklahoma, even with clear state precedent
that the doctrine has barred insurers from switching their rationales for
denying coverage. It also conflicts with another longstanding Oklahoma
contract doctrine, the “reasonable expectations” doctrine, in its construction
of a coverage denial. Allowing insurers, especially surplus lines insurers
that do not even operate in applicable states, to essentially waive coverage
based on minutiae should raise eyebrows.
After James River’s business decision to part ways with Uber,
“conventional” insurers including Liberty Mutual,191 Farmers,192 and
CSAA, through a new subsidiary called Mobilitas,193 have begun offering
coverage specifically for ridesharing. Whether the retention of
“conventional” insurers, as opposed to a “surplus lines” insurer like James
River, will have an impact on Uber’s policies on the judicial front remains
to be seen. Any resulting circuit split would not only require similar
litigation to move past the settlement or arbitration stage, but would also
191. Matthew Lerner, Liberty Mutual Signs on as Uber Insurer, BUS. INS. (Jan. 2, 2020),
https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20200102/NEWS06/912332397/Liberty-Mutualto-be-Uber-Technologies-auto-insurer.
192. Press Release, Farmers Insurance, Farmers Insurance Begins Year Providing
Commercial Auto Insurance Coverage to Uber Drivers in 13 New Markets (Jan. 6, 2020),
https://newsroom.farmers.com/2020-01-06-Farmers-Insurance-R-Begins-Year-ProvidingCommercial-Auto-Insurance-Coverage-to-Uber-Drivers-in-13-New-Markets.
193. Amy O’Connor, An Insurance Lyft: CSAA Forms Rideshare Carrier; Allstate,
Liberty Mutual Offer Coverage, INS. J. (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.insurancejournal.com/
news/national/2020/10/06/585458.htm.
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require another jurisdiction to have the tenacity to go against the
ridesharing juggernaut.
William W. Whitehurst
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